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THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps only taking a back seat to the economy, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”)1 stood front and center in 
the 2012 United States presidential election.2 But the Affordable Care Act’s 
prominence in the American political landscape has been evident since its 
inception. In March 2010, despite Democratic control of Congress, H.R. 
3590—which would later become the Affordable Care Act—barely mus-
tered the requisite number of votes needed for enactment.3 Formal congres-
sional debate ended when President Barack Obama signed the resolution 
into law on March 23, 2010;4 however, debate amongst the American popu-
lace persisted and polarized the nation on the issue of healthcare reform. 
Healthcare reform in the United States can be traced back to the early 
twentieth-century.5 At its roots, the social movement could best be described 
as strictly a “government-sponsored program of health insurance.”6 This 
initial, or “progressive,” era of history saw the introduction of health insur-
ance “as a program of income maintenance for wage earners[,] . . . disease 
prevention[,] and increased national efficiency.”7 Although some elements 
of reform caught on, namely through private business, results fell short of 
the compulsory system that most progressives envisioned.8 
Societal changes also changed the view of healthcare reform from one 
of income maintenance to “a program primarily of medical care financing” 
that sought to increase access through the use of a risk allocation based sys-
  
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). 
 2. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, The Most Important Issue of this Election: Obamacare, 
WONKBLOG (Oct. 26, 2012, 11:13 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
wp/2012/10/26/the-most-important-issue-of-this-election-health-reform. 
 3. Office of the Clerk, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 165, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 21, 2010, 10:49 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll165.xml. 
The Act passed in the House with a final vote of 219 to 212. Id. Thirty-four Democratic con-
gressmen joined unanimous Republicans in opposition to the Act. Id. 
 4. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With 
a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19. 
 5. See Paul Starr, Transformation in Defeat: The Changing Objectives of National 
Health Insurance, 1915–1980, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 78, 78 (1982). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. The progressive era lasted until the early 1930s. Id. at 78–81. 
 8. Id. at 79. 
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tem.9 Reformers made efforts to become part of FDR’s New Deal.10 But 
those efforts proved to be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, reformers trudged 
ahead, gaining some traction during the 1940s with the Wagner-Murray-
Dingell bill and President Truman’s 1945 health program.11 Ultimately, the 
reformer’s efforts did not pay off until the passage of Medicare and Medi-
caid in 1965—well short of their early goals of a truly universal program.12 
The third era of reform most resembles what people think of today. 
Healthcare reform evolved, once again; only this time, the focus became 
cost control, institutional reform, and universal coverage.13 Much like the 
earlier eras, reformers here met continued resistance. During the 1970s, 
headway—the Nixon plan—seemed a sure thing.14 The plan “would have 
mandated coverage by private employers—a regulatory approach to expand-
ing health insurance that relied on copayments and other benefit limitations 
to control expenditures.”15 But it too failed, this time falling victim to politi-
cal scandal.16 Attempts at reform continued but did not make much of a po-
litical splash until the Clintons advanced proposals in the 1990s.17 As ex-
pected, these proposals ended in the same manner that many before them 
had. Until the Affordable Care Act, never before had Americans seen such 
sweeping reforms implemented, at least in modern history. 
These attempts at reform show that even in today’s parlance, healthcare 
reform is hardly a novel concept.18 Through the three eras, lawmakers and 
policy analysts have attempted to address our country’s staggering health 
care costs.19 Because cost represented only one of the three sides of the 
healthcare industry’s “iron triangle,” it was only a matter of time before any 
discussion on the topic raised competing issues with access and quality.20 
  
 9. Id. at 81–84. This second era, some say, lasted much longer than its predecessor, 
eventually giving way to a third chapter in the late 1960s. Id. 
 10. Id. at 81. 
 11. Starr, supra note 5, at 81. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 78. 
 14. Id. at 85. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See George J. Annas, Health Care Reform in America: Beyond Ideology, 5 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 441, 442–45 (2008). 
 18. E.g., Summary of a 1993 Republican Health Reform Plan, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/February/23/GOP-1993-
health-reform-bill.aspx. In 1993, Republican Senator John Chafee introduced a healthcare 
reform bill that sought goals similar to the ACA, including universal coverage. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., id. The cost-focus seems most evident in the third era of reform; although 
the previous eras may not have campaigned on cost-control, the topic, inevitably, also came 
to be a significant part of the discussion. Starr, supra note 5, at 79–85. 
 20. Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues 
and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 255–61 (2005). 
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Essentially, this iron triangle was at the crux of every debate over healthcare 
reform in the United States and abroad.21 Both sides of the American politi-
cal aisle often agreed about the state of the healthcare system but disagreed, 
on a fundamental level, about how to address all the deficiencies. 
The conservative argument centers on traditional notions of less gov-
ernment, including less regulation.22 This free market approach grounds 
itself in two major premises: first, individuals must be responsible for their 
own health care;23 and second, a truly free market can accomplish goals that 
a government-run system cannot.24 
Naturally, the liberal argument represents the other side of the coin. 
This perspective generally sees health care as a fundamental right, much like 
the right to vote, to free speech, and to marry.25 With this in mind, many 
liberals see the government as duty-bound to facilitate healthcare for all 
citizens, using a hands-on approach.26 
Previous attempts to enact sweeping healthcare reforms have failed, but 
with the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, the liberal perspective would 
be put to a constitutional test. And the test came immediately. On the same 
day President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law, opponents 
filed numerous suits that challenged the law’s constitutionality.27 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ACT 
To better understand these challenges to the Affordable Care Act, a 
basic overview of the entire piece of legislation is useful. As enacted, the 
Affordable Care Act contains ten titles: (I) Quality, Affordable Health Care 
  
 21. A British scholar, using the phrase “inconsistent triad” in lieu of “iron triangle,” 
characterized the issue as being without technical solutions. See JOHN BUTLER, THE ETHICS OF 
HEALTH CARE RATIONING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 3 (1999). “[T]he problem is inherently 
contestable because it touches upon social, political and economic values about which people 
not only care but disagree.” Id. 
 22. See Robert M. Sade, Foundational Ethics of the Health Care System: The Moral and 
Practical Superiority of Free Market Reforms, 33 J. MED. & PHIL. 461, 462–63 (2008). 
 23. Id. at 463. 
 24. See id. at 488; see also William Kristol, How to Oppose the Health Plan—and Why, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1994, at A14. 
 25. See Sade, supra note 22, at 463. 
 26. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks on Healthcare at a Joint Session 
of Congress (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care/. The President 
stated that “government has to step in to help deliver on [the] promise” of universal 
healthcare. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Complaint, Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 
3:10CV188), 2010 WL 1038397; see also Katherine Hayes & Sarah Rosenbaum, Legal Chal-
lenges to the Affordable Care Act, HEALTHREFORMGPS (Dec. 14, 2010), 
http://healthreformgps.org/resources/health-reform-and-the-constitutional-challenges. 
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for All Americans; (II) Role of Public Programs; (III) Improving the Quality 
and Efficiency of Health Care; (IV) Prevention of Chronic Disease and Im-
proving Public Health; (V) Health Care Workforce; (VI) Transparency and 
Program Integrity; (VII) Improving Access to Innovative Medical Thera-
pies; (VIII) Class Act; (IX) Revenue Provisions; and (X) Strengthening 
Quality, Affordable Health Care for All Americans.28  
Title I of the Affordable Care Act contains most of the widely known 
and discussed provisions. For instance, the “individual mandate” provi-
sion,29 regarded as the legislation’s lynchpin,30 is located there. It requires 
most citizens to obtain minimum essential coverage beginning in 2014.31 
Title I also requires certain employers to provide coverage to employees.32 
Other significant provisions in Title I establish the minimum coverage in-
surers must offer,33 create insurance exchanges that allow consumers to shop 
for coverage with relative ease,34 “limit[] insurers’ ability to deny, rescind, 
and non-renew coverage,”35 restrict the ability to apply lifetime caps on cov-
erage,36 and require insurers to provide preventative care without any addi-
tional out of pocket costs to the insured.37 
  
 28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
119–30 (2010).  
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. 2010); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. 2010). 
 30. Marc Siegel, The Individual Mandate Is Obamacare’s Linchpin, NAT’L REVIEW 
ONLINE (Aug. 15, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/274576/ 
individual-mandate-obamacare-s-linchpin-marc-siegel#. Many view this provision as the key 
to maintaining “a market-based system of health insurance.” Jenna L. Kamiat, PPACA and 
the Individual Mandate: A Healthy Approach to Severability, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 
2250 (2012) (citing Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1974 (2011)). Unlike the distribution of people who receive health 
insurance through employers, individuals without such employer-based coverage tend to 
allocate risk inefficiently. See id. Younger people are, as a whole, healthier and tend to forego 
coverage, which leaves older people, who are comparatively not as healthy or even un-
healthy, as the primary demographic in the insurance pool. See id. Without requiring those 
healthy persons to acquire coverage, the insurers would be unable to operate. 
 31. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. 2010). Failure to do so would subject the individual to a 
monetary penalty. Id. § 5000A(c). 
 32. Id. § 4980H.  
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (Supp. 2010). 
 34. Id. § 18031. 
 35. J. Angelo DeSantis & Gabriel Ravel, The Consequences of Repealing Health Care 
Reform in Early 2013, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 365, 372 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-2, 
300gg-3, 300gg-12 (Supp. 2010)). 
 36. Neil S. Siegal, Essay, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: 
Customary Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 DUKE L.J. 797, 810 
(2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (Supp. 2010)). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. 2010)). 
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Title II of the Affordable Care Act expands eligibility for Medicaid.38 
“In 2014, Americans earning less than 138% of the poverty line will be eli-
gible for Medicaid.”39 This expansion has been predicted to capture approx-
imately fifty million uninsured Americans.40 Additionally, Title II simplifies 
individual enrollment options for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (CHIP) by offering a web-based interface similar to the state-
based exchanges commissioned by Title I.41 
Title III attempts to reduce Medicare costs by restructuring and stream-
lining payment systems.42 The legislation seeks to link payment to quality 
outcomes and incentivizes third-party oversight organizations to take re-
sponsibility for health care costs and quality.43 
The Affordable Care Act, through Title IV, seeks to improve public 
health by creating a new interagency prevention council.44 This council will 
focus on preventative care by increasing patient access and supporting pub-
lic health innovation through research.45 
Title V of the Affordable Care Act strives to improve quality of 
healthcare through workforce enhancement.46 Anticipated changes here mir-
ror front-end efforts, to some extent, that various states have already been 
implementing. Focusing on primary care, the Affordable Care Act seeks to 
offer financial incentives for physicians to enter into family medicine, gen-
eral practice, and pediatrics.47 
Title VI aims “to combat fraud and abuse in public and private pro-
grams.”48 The primary focus of these protective provisions is on Medicare 
and Medicaid, nursing homes, long-term care facilities, and other similar 
care providers.49 
  
 38. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
121–22 (2010). 
 39. DeSantis & Ravel, supra note 35, at 373 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (Supp. 2010)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. DEMOCRATIC POLICY & COMMC’NS CTR., THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: DETAILED SUMMARY 3–4, available at http://dpc.senate.gov
/healthreformbill/healthbill04.pdf. 
 42. See DeSantis & Ravel, supra note 35, at 373–74 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (Supp. 
2010)). 
 43. DEMOCRATIC POLICY & COMMC’NS CTR., supra note 41, at 4–6. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Id. at 6–7. 
 46. See id. at 7–9. 
 47. Id. at 7–9; see also DeSantis & Ravel, supra note 35, at 374 (citing Karen Davis et 
al., How the Affordable Care Act Will Strengthen the Nation’s Primary Care Foundation, 26 
J. INTERNAL MED. 1201, 1201–02 (2011)). 
 48. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY & COMMC’NS CTR., supra note 41, at 9. 
 49. See DeSantis & Ravel, supra note 35, at 374. 
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Unlike the previous provisions, Title VII focuses strictly on pharma-
ceuticals.50 Essentially, the Affordable Care Act establishes a process by 
which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can readily approve and 
license a similar, generic version of an existing pharmaceutical product, 
resulting in more price competition and innovation.51 
Title VIII authorizes the establishment of a “national voluntary insur-
ance program for purchasing community living assistance services and sup-
port.”52 This is known as the CLASS program.53 However, the current ad-
ministration chose not to implement the program when it determined that 
adverse selections would make insurance premiums unaffordable.54 
Title IX and X do not contain any substantive health care provisions. 
Title IX of the Affordable Care Act is the revenue or funding provision that 
helps fund the health care expansion.55 Title X is the manager’s amendments 
legislation that amends previous sections of the United States Code to give 
effect to the Affordable Care Act’s new legislation.56 
III. LOWER COURT CHALLENGES 
Affordable Care Act opponents filed numerous legal challenges on the 
very day President Obama signed the legislation into law.57 Although more 
than twenty separate challenges were made,58 a case before the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals became the challenge that ultimately gave rise to 
the Supreme Court of the United States’s ruling on the constitutionality of 
the Affordable Care Act.59 In National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (“NFIB v. Sebelius”), twenty-six states, several individuals, and 
the National Federation of Independent Business joined together as plaintiffs 
to challenge certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act.60 From this case, 
  
 50. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY & COMMC’NS CTR., supra note 41, at 12. 
 51. See id. Although not truly a generic, as used in pharmaceutical jargon, biologic 
drugs, which are the focus of Title VII, “are treatments created by biological processes, such 
as vaccines, blood, and tissues. Biologic drugs are larger, more complex molecules than the 
‘small-molecule drugs’ more typically associated with prescription drugs. Their complexity 
makes creating generic versions difficult.” DeSantis & Ravel, supra note 35, at 374–75 
(footnotes omitted). 
 52. DEMOCRATIC POLICY & COMMC’NS CTR., supra note 41, at 12. 
 53. Id. 
 54. DeSantis & Ravel, supra note 35, at 375. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 371. 
 57. See discussion supra Part I. 
 58. Hayes & Rosenbaum, supra note 27. For a good description of the various challeng-
es made in different United States Federal District Courts, see Defending the Affordable Care 
Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/healthcare (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
 59. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 60. Id. at 2580 [hereinafter NFIB v. Sebelius]. 
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two provisions of the Affordable Care Act reached the Supreme Court for 
review: the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.61 
In the original complaint filed in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Florida, the plaintiffs alleged six different ways in 
which the Affordable Care Act violated the Constitution.62 Most of these 
claims were based on alleged violations of the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, but the plaintiffs also challenged parts of the Affordable Care Act 
under the Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment Substantive Due Process 
Clause, and Article I.63 The specific statutory provisions at the heart of those 
violations included the individual mandate and concomitant penalty.64 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the Medicaid expansion and health benefit 
exchange provision proved too coercive to withstand constitutional chal-
lenge.65 With respect to the individual mandate, the plaintiffs also made al-
ternative arguments: if the mandate was considered a tax, it was an “uncon-
stitutional unapportioned capitation or direct tax.”66 
On cross motions for summary judgment, Judge Vinson of the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ruled that the Af-
fordable Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid did not “violate the Spending 
Clause and principles of federalism protected under the Ninth and Tenth 
  
 61. Id. For a discussion of the two different provisions, see supra Part II. For a general 
overview of the Supreme Court’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius, see Comment, National Fed-
eration of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 72 (2012). 
 62. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 
1120, 1129–30 (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. at 1130. 
 66. Id. The district court outlined the plaintiffs’ six claims more specifically as follows: 
 
(1) [T]he individual mandate and concomitant penalty exceed Congress’s author-
ity under the Commerce Clause and violate the Ninth and Tenth Amendments . . 
. ; (2) the individual mandate and penalty violate substantive due process under 
the Fifth Amendment . . . ; (3) “alternatively,” if the penalty imposed for failing 
to comply  with the individual mandate is found to be a tax, it is an unconstitu-
tional unapportioned capitation or direct tax in violation of U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 4, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments . . . ; (4) the Act coerces and com-
mandeers the states with respect to Medicaid by altering and expanding the pro-
gram in violation of Article I and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments . . . ; (5) it 
coerces and commandeers with respect to the health benefit exchanges in viola-
tion of Article I and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments . . . ; and (6) the employer 
mandate interferes with the states’ sovereignty as large employers and in the per-
formance of government functions in violation of Article I and the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments . . . . 
 
Id. at 1129–30. 
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Amendments.”67 After summarily concluding that the Affordable Care Act 
passed muster under a South Dakota v. Dole68 analysis, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that using Medicaid funding as a carrot to coax states’ 
compliance was impermissibly coercive, finding that at a fundamental level, 
the decision to participate in the Medicaid program is completely volun-
tary.69 
Despite upholding the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion, the 
district court also ruled that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate 
found in Title I violated the Commerce Clause.70 Specifically, the court was 
concerned as to whether Congress had the authority to regulate activities 
substantially affecting interstate commerce.71 Noting that “[i]t would be a 
radical departure from existing case law to hold that Congress can regulate 
inactivity under the Commerce Clause,”72 the court resolved its concern by 
finding “that the individual mandate seeks to regulate economic inactivity, 
which is the very opposite of economic activity. And because activity is 
required under the Commerce Clause, the individual mandate exceeds Con-
gress’s commerce power, as it is understood, defined, and applied in the 
existing Supreme Court case law.”73 
Continuing on, the court suggested that the individual mandate could 
not “be otherwise authorized by an assertion of power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.”74 Despite agreeing with the defendants’ assertion “that 
the individual mandate is absolutely ‘necessary’ and ‘essential’ for the [Af-
fordable Care Act] to operate as it was intended by Congress, . . . [it] falls 
outside the boundary of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority and cannot 
be reconciled with a limited government of enumerated powers. By defini-
tion, it cannot be ‘proper.’”75 As such, the individual mandate could not sur-
vive by virtue of Congress’s power through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
Because the mandate had no constitutional authority to rest upon and 
since it was “inextricably bound together in purpose” with the Affordable 
Care Act’s remaining provisions, the court ruled that the mandate was not 
  
 67. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1265 (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 68. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 69. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–69. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 1273. 
 72. Id. at 1286. 
 73. Id. at 1295. 
 74. Id. at 1298–99. 
 75. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. 
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severable.76 Consequently, the entire Affordable Care Act had to fall as a 
single unit.77 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed many of the lower court’s rul-
ings, including the Medicaid expansion ruling,78 the individual mandate-
Commerce Clause ruling,79 and the ruling that the mandate could not be 
upheld as a tax,80 which was somewhat understated in the district court’s 
opinion.81 Despite affirming the district court’s rulings on the three previous 
points, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the severability ruling.82 The stage was 
set for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION 
After the Eleventh Circuit rendered its opinion, the Federal Department 
of Health and Human Services petitioned for writ of certiorari.83 The Su-
preme Court of the United States granted the government’s petition on three 
questions84: “whether the Affordable Care Act must be invalidated in its 
entirety because it is non-severable from the individual mandate that ex-
ceeds Congress’ limited and enumerated powers under the Constitution;”85 
“[w]hether Congress had the power under Article I of the Constitution to 
enact the minimum coverage provision;”86 “[w]hether the suit brought by 
respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provisions of the [Afforda-
ble Care Act] is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act [(AIA)];”87 and “[d]oes 
Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate basic principles of fed-
eralism when it coerces States into accepting onerous conditions that it 
could not impose directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding un-
der the single largest grant-in-aid program, or does the limitation on Con-
  
 76. Id. at 1305. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1268 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 79. Id. at 1311. 
 80. Id. at 1313–14. Importantly, Congress’s Tax and Spend power is quite broad. Id. at 
1314. The issue here was that the ACA’s legislative history and statutory text indicated that 
the provision was a penalty as opposed to a tax. Id. 
 81. See Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1265 n.4. 
 82. Id. at 1328. 
 83. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 
11-400); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-393). 
 84. Florida v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); Sebelius v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 
(2011); NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011). 
 85. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-393). 
 86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398). 
 87. Id. 
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gress’s spending power . . . no longer apply?”88 In March 2012, the Supreme 
Court sat for three days of oral argument on the issues presented in NFIB v. 
Sebelius.89 The Court rendered its opinion on the last day of the October 
2011 term.90 Penned by the Chief Justice, the majority opinion affirmed and 
reversed, in part, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion.91 
Preliminarily, Roberts, along with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, dismissed the notion that the AIA did not preclude 
review of the suit.92 The AIA requires individuals subject to a tax to pay it 
and then sue to get a refund, if they were entitled; this is in lieu of challeng-
ing the tax in court before paying it first.93 As it relates to the Affordable 
Care Act, the question here was whether challenging the individual mandate 
amounted to challenging a tax before paying it.94 Noting that Congress re-
ferred to the individual mandate as a penalty rather than a tax, Roberts held 
that at least for the purposes of the AIA, the individual mandate was not a 
tax.95 Foreshadowing later portions of his opinion, Roberts distinguished the 
tax analysis for AIA from the analysis that should be made for constitutional 
purposes: “It is true that Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a 
tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or 
the other.”96 
Next, the Chief Justice, writing only for himself, held that Congress 
lacked the authority to enact the individual mandate under both the Com-
merce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses.97 Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause clearly permits regulation of commercial activity; alt-
hough failing to purchase a product will certainly have an effect on inter-
state commerce, Roberts thought that compelling individuals to take some 
affirmative action to mitigate that effect falls outside the bounds of Con-
  
 88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-400). 
 89. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Cases, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PPAACA.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 
2013). 
 90. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012). 
 91. Id. at 2577, 2609. 
 92. Id. at 2582–84. 
 93. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (Supp. 2010). The Anti-Injunction Act provides that “no 
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained 
in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax 
was assessed.” Id. “This statute protects the Government’s ability to collect a consistent 
stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of tax-
es.” Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2582. 
 94. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2583. 
 97. Id. at 2585–93. 
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gress’s Commerce Clause power.98 And permitting Congress to use their 
power in that manner would effectively expand its authority to a level with-
out limitation.99 Reaching a similar result under Congress’s power from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Roberts held that unlike laws previously up-
held, which “involved exercise of authority derivative of, and in service to, a 
granted power[,] . . . [t]he individual mandate . . . vests Congress with the 
extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an 
enumerated power.”100 That type of bootstrapping fell outside the scope of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.101 
Chief Justice Roberts, again only writing for himself, began paving the 
way to upholding the individual mandate through his discussion of the con-
stitutional avoidance doctrine.102 Relying on past opinions penned by Justic-
es Story103 and Holmes,104 Roberts stated that “it is well established that if a 
statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, 
courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”105 And by describing 
the inquiry as determining whether a particular interpretation is “fairly pos-
sible” or “a reasonable construction,” Roberts embraced the government’s 
argument that the individual mandate was, for purposes other than the AIA, 
a tax.106 Roberts’s somewhat cryptic analysis of the individual mandate dur-
ing his AIA discussion did, in fact, prove to be a foreshadowing of a second 
tax analysis.107 
Using the constitutional avoidance doctrine, Roberts upheld the indi-
vidual mandate as a permissible exercise of Congress’s power granted by 
the Constitution’s Tax and Spend Clause.108 His opinion was joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. In light of holding that the 
mandate was not a tax for AIA purposes, the Chief Justice stated: 
It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a “penalty,” not 
a “tax.” But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti–
Injunction Act, . . . it does not determine whether the payment may be 
viewed as an exercise of Congress's taxing power. It is up to Congress 
whether to apply the Anti–Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it 
makes sense to be guided by Congress's choice of label on that question. 
  
 98. Id. at 2585–91 (“The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to 
compel it . . . .”). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 101. See id. at 2592–93. 
 102. See id. at 2593–94. 
 103. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448–49 (1830). 
 104. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927). 
 105. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 106. Id. at 2593–94. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. at 2594–95. 
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That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within 
Congress's constitutional power to tax.109 
After reaching this result, Roberts also held that the individual man-
date, being a tax, complied with the Constitution’s Direct Tax Clause.110 
Although he upheld the individual mandate under the Tax and Spend 
Clause, Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, concluded his opin-
ion by striking down the Medicaid expansion provision for being unconsti-
tutionally coercive.111 Generally, Congress is able to enact legislation “to 
pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United 
States.”112 And, the Court has held that Congress may condition states’ ac-
ceptance of federal funding by requiring them to take specific or certain 
actions.113 After establishing this premise, Roberts focused on the bounds of 
permissible conditions Congress might tie to such grants.114 Without estab-
lishing a bright-line, the Chief Justice did ultimately hold that the Medicaid 
expansion provisions of the Affordable Care Act proved too coercive to pass 
constitutional muster.115 However, in Roberts’s view, the Affordable Care 
Act could be upheld by precluding withdrawal of existing Medicaid funding 
for failure to meet the new conditions Congress attempted to tack on; in 
other words, the provision was severable.116 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote separately to ex-
press her views that the individual mandate was a proper exercise of Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause117 and that the Medicaid expan-
sion provisions did not violate the Spending Clause.118 In her Commerce 
Clause discussion, which was also joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, 
Ginsburg seemed to easily reach the conclusion that inactivity could always 
be seen as activity from a slightly different perspective: “An individual who 
opts not to purchase insurance from a private insurer can be seen as actively 
selecting another form of insurance: self-insurance. . . . The minimum cov-
erage provision could therefore be described as regulating activists in the 
self-insurance market.”119 Getting over the activity-inactivity hurdles, Gins-
  
 109. Id. at 2594. 
 110. Id. at 2598–99. The Direct Tax Clause provides, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax 
shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 111. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95. 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 113. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–02. 
 114. Id. at 2602–03. 
 115. Id. at 2606–07. 
 116. See id. at 2638–40. 
 117. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment, dissenting in 
part). 
 118. Id. at 2641–42. 
 119. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 (internal citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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burg had no problem establishing the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate under Congress’s Commerce power.120 
Going beyond the Commerce Clause, Ginsburg criticized the Chief 
Justice’s discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause.121 Here, she and 
Sotomayor were again joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan. Although 
Ginsburg appeared to focus more on criticism than anything else, her opin-
ion surely suggested that the individual mandate also falls within Congress’s 
purview under the Necessary and Proper Clause.122 
In the last section of the joint concurrence that Justices Breyer and 
Kagan endorsed, Justice Ginsburg briefly stated that she agreed with Rob-
erts’s holding that Congress was permitted to enact the individual mandate 
under the Tax and Spend Clause, but not without offering one last parting 
criticism: 
I concur in that determination, which makes THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s 
Commerce Clause essay all the more puzzling. Why should THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE strive so mightily to hem in Congress’ capacity to meet the 
new problems arising constantly in our ever-developing modern econo-
my? I find no satisfying response to that question in his opinion.123 
Writing only for herself and Sotomayor, Ginsburg concluded her con-
currence by expressing her desire to uphold the Medicaid expansion.124 Alt-
hough she agreed with Roberts’s holding that the constitutional violation 
could be remedied by not withdrawing federal funding for the States that 
choose not to adopt the expansion’s new conditions, Ginsburg found that the 
expansions were not too coercive to begin with.125 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, penned 
the joint dissenting opinion.126 In the individual mandate discussion, the 
joint dissent pointed out that the Court’s prior decisions offer the following 
idea: 
[T]he Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help achieve 
the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce[,] . . . [and] the 
scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause is exceeded not only when the 
congressional action directly violates the sovereignty of the States but al-
  
 120. Id. at 2625. 
 121. Id. at 2626–28. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 2629. 
 124. Id. at 2629–42.  
 125. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2629–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
judgment, dissenting in part). 
 126. Id. at 2642 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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so when it violates the background principle of enumerated . . . federal 
power.127 
The government’s argument in the instant case took Congress’s action 
far beyond what it was permitted to do by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.128 But even after reaching that conclusion, the joint dissent contin-
ued on to suggest, as Roberts did in the majority opinion, that the individual 
mandate exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power despite its creative 
efforts to keep it within permissible bounds; this creative effort was that the 
individuals who chose not to purchase insurance would later become mem-
bers of the healthcare market.129 “Such a definition of market participants is 
unprecedented, and were it to be a premise for the exercise of national pow-
er, it would have no principled limits.”130 
The joint dissent went on to tackle the majority’s discussion of the in-
dividual mandate as permitted by the Tax and Spend Clause. There, the joint 
dissent quickly pointed out the dichotomy of the majority’s analysis in hold-
ing that the mandate was “[a] penalty for constitutional purposes [and] is 
also a tax for constitutional purposes.”131 Using a variety of statutory inter-
pretation tools and doctrines—including the constitutional avoidance doc-
trine—the joint dissent concluded that the individual mandate was a penalty 
and not a tax.132 Because the mandate was not a tax, the dissenting justices 
believed, like the majority, that the AIA did not preclude the suit.133 
Before concluding with his discussion on severability, the dissent dis-
cussed the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act.134 Like all but Ginsburg and Sotomayor, the dissenting 
justices also found that the expansion proved too coercive to withstand scru-
tiny.135 Where they differed, however, was whether the expansion could 
stand based on the proposed remedy precluding withdrawal of funding from 
the states that opted against meeting the additional conditions imposed by 
the expansion provisions.136 The crux of this holding, according to the dis-
sent, was an impermissible example of judicial activism.137 
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Finally, the joint dissent concluded with an extended discussion on 
severability.138 Operating from the premise that both the individual mandate 
and the Medicaid expansion provisions should be stricken in their entirety, 
the dissenting justices demonstrated how the Affordable Care Act’s various 
provisions were too intertwined to withstand severability.139 In holding that 
the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate and Medicaid expansion pro-
visions were not severable, the dissenting justices aptly concluded their 
opinion. 
Through all the concurring and dissenting opinions,140 the Medicaid 
expansion provisions would remain the only victim to constitutional chal-
lenges. More importantly, many would say, the real changes occurred in the 
development of constitutional jurisprudence. 
V. THE SYMPOSIUM 
The United States Supreme Court’s NFIB v. Sebelius decision is al-
ready considered to be one of the landmark opinions of the Roberts court. 
No case has been followed so closely and carefully since Bush v. Gore.141 
The broad scope of the Court’s holding has raised numerous questions about 
the current state of constitutional law. Because these fundamental issues 
have been raised, NFIB v. Sebelius is worthy of extended study. 
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